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Presented herein are safeguard features for Long Range wide-area network 
(LoRaWAN) deployments on a LoRa gateway.  The techniques presented herein provide 
a solution to prevent end users from wrongly or accidentally deploying LoRa gateways in 
unlawful Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) radio bands. The techniques presented 
herein require little computational and storage resources to be integrated into any LoRa 
gateway embedded system, operate automatically based on the standard LNS protocol, and 




LoRa gateways for LoRaWAN supports the LoRa™ physical layer technology and 
complies with the LoRaWAN specification to provide Low Power Wide Area wireless 
connectivity for low data rate, battery-powered devices and sensors through the unlicensed 
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Figure 1. LoRaWAN with LoRa Gateway 
 
A LoRa gateway requires proper configurations in order to both control local LoRa 
radio hardware and interact with the LoRa NS at the backend. These configurations can be 
classified into two categories: 
 Static, platform dependent configurations (such as radio TX Look Up Table - TX 
LUT). 
 Dynamic, platform independent and user-controlled configurations (such as the 
channel plans, i.e. frequency allocation). 
Generally, platform dependent configurations could be well controlled by gateway 
vendors and are rarely exposed to the end user.  On the other hand, the platform 
independent configurations are vulnerable to error and abuse.  The fact that LoRa gateways 
operate in ISM radio bands worldwide complicates the scenario, since each country/region 
has different rules and regulations for devices using ISM bands. 
The techniques presented herein address these issues by providing a “safeguard” 
layer to end users that prevents improper configurations, which in turn could lead to 
violations of local regulations and legal disputes. 
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Terminology: 
 LoRa - Stands for Long Range, which is based on spread spectrum modulation 
techniques derived from chirp spread spectrum (CSS) technology. 
 LoRaWAN - A low power, wide area networking (LPWAN) protocol based on 
LoRa technology. 
 LNS - Stands for LoRa Network Server, which takes the LoRa packets from end 
devices and distributes them to applications. Also, it controls end LoRa devices and 
LoRa gateways through LoRa MAC commands and protocols.  
 LoRa Packet Forwarder - An agent running on a LoRa gateway, forwarding RF 
packets received by LoRa radio hardware to a LoRaWAN Network Server and 
transmitting RF packets sent by the LNS to end LoRa devices. 
 LoRa UDP Packet Forwarder (UPF in short) - The legacy LoRa Packet Forwarder 
using UDP/IP as network layer and operating based on a basic communication 
protocol between LoRa gateway and LNS (udp packet forwarder protocol, UPF 
protocol in short).  
 CPF- Stands for Common Packet Forwarder, which is a new generation of LoRa 
Packet Forwarder supported on certain LoRa gateways.  CPF is based on the 
implementation of “basic station,” which enables certain LoRaWAN gateways to 
operate as open platforms. 
 LNS Protocol - The protocol running between a LoRa gateway and the LoRa 
Network Server in CPF, which includes the LNS discovery, authentications, 
gateway configurations, uplink and downlink data interactions, synchronization. 
 Channel Plan -  A set of frequency and bandwidth combinations along with some 
other LoRa specific parameters, such as Spreading Factor (SF), where the gateway's 
radio operates on. The LoRa end devices communicates with the gateway on these 
channels. 
 
After  the LoRa gateway starts the packet forwarder, it takes the configurations, 
programs the LoRa radio, then starts relaying the LoRa packets. The configurations may 
come from: 
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 One configuration file (local or downloaded from remote server), which contains 
both platform dependent and independent parameters. 
 One local configuration file, containing only platform dependent parameters, while 
the platform independent parameters are from LNS. CPF, as the state-of-art LoRa 
Packet Forwarder, uses this method. 
 
On the LoRa gateway, only limited sanity checks are performed when 
configurations are received. For example, while applying the radio configurations to the 
RF hardware,  the gateway only checks whether those parameters are beyond the hardware 
limits, such as bandwidth, frequency, etc.  
Some variants of packet forwarders, which are mostly proprietary to their own LNS 
vendors, often use a different approach. For example, for the packet forwarder, long range 
relay (LRR), the backend server takes control of everything and some validations and 
checks could be done when setting up the gateway. The LRR then needs to obtain the 
configurations from the server through side channels. 
However, little has been done on the gateway side to validate the configurations 
before setup of the radio hardware. Verification at this stage is even more critical due to 
the fact that: 
 The gateway is the last chance to check against improper configurations before 
turning on the radio. 
 The gateway has the most accurate local information, such as locations, channel 
qualities, which are important for some of the configurations. 
 The gateway is neutral to the backend LNS. Any implementation of LNS 
complying with the LoRa specifications could interact with the gateway. It is not 
safe to assume that backend server would always provide the correct parameters for 
the gateway. Doing everything on the LNS side still leaves the gateways vulnerable 
to misconfigurations or malicious attacks, especially when gateways need to 
interact with LNS from different vendors.  
 Since LoRa gateways operate in a broad range of ISM radio bands, there are an 
enormous number of feasible channel plans.  Furthermore, a LoRa radio covers a 
much wider area (in terms of miles) compared to other low power wireless 
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techniques (e.g., WIFI, 802.15.4) running on the ISM bands.  As such, it is very 
critical for the LoRa gateway to strictly comply with the local ISM radio 
regulations. It is also necessary for end users to have a simple automated 
mechanism to safeguard against invalid channel plans. 
 
The so-called “safeguard” techniques presented herein include two key parts, 
referred to as “Localization” and “Validation.”  Localization utilizes the GPS modules on 
the LoRa gateways to identify the resident country/region, which is suitable for the outdoor 
deployment. GPS localization (reverse geocoding) usually is done through online map 
services, which require Internet access and have limits on the number of queries per day. 
However,  this method cannot be used in gateways located in air gapped LoRa networks 
or  austere locations with limited Internet access.  Accordingly, an offline localization 
method is adopted here.  
Given the limited storage and computation resources on gateways, a lightweight 
localization algorithm and condensed GPS database footprint ( ~3 to 4 MB compressed) 
[CH(1]is used instead to achieve comparable accuracy to the Internet-based map services. 
The GPS database stores boundary landmarks (longitude and latitude coordinates) of each 
country/region. Given a point with GPS coordinates, the system finds the boundary 
landmark with the closest distance, of which resident region/country is in. Note that the 
landmarks in GPS database are partitioned into smaller areas according to their coordinates, 
so that it only needs search a handful of point sets for the closest landmark. The overall 
procedure is shown in Figure 2, below. 
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Figure 2. Offline Reverse Geocoding (Localization) 
 
Validation of configuration uses the result of the gateway localization process, as 
explained above. First, a Region/Country Rule Database has been created to collect all the 
constraints for a LoRa gateway to use the ISM radio bands in each region/country. The 
Region/Country Rule Database consists of: 
 All available LoRa Multi-SF band, in format of <center freq, bandwidth, min_SF, 
max_SF>. 
 All available LoRa standard band, in format of <center freq, bandwidth, SF>. 
 All available LoRa FSK band, in format of <center freq, bandwidth, bit_rate>. 
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 Max EIRP. 
The checking criteria can be expanded as needed. When a packet forwarder on a 
gateway takes configurations, the packet forwarder validates each applicable configuration 
with the Region/Country Rule Database before applying all the configurations to the radio 
hardware.  The validation passes only if all of the configurations do not violate the checking 
criteria.  If one or more configurations do violate the checking criteria, then the packet 
forwarder rejects the configurations and prompts a user with an error message, thereby 
preventing the gateway from operating with  improperly assigned configurations (e.g., 
improper radio frequencies, bandwidth, etc.). 
The following illustrates how the safeguard techniques presented herein can be 
integrated into the CPF on a LoRa gateway.  Similar procedures can be used to integrate 
this feature into other packet forwarders on LoRa gateways. 
Figure 3, below, illustrates a series of stages used to start up CPF on an example 
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Figure 3. Integration Example with CPF 
 
Some additional procedures are introduced into the startup process shown above to 
implement the safeguards against improper configuration. As shown in Figure 4 below, the 
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Localization module periodically updates the location information based on the offline 
reverse geocoding method as explained previously.  
 
 
Figure 4. Integration Example with CPF 
 
When the CPF interacts with the LNS and receives the <router_config> message 
(which is in JSON format as shown in Figure 5), it then parses the message and validates 
each radio band configuration with Region/Country Rule Database before programming to 
the radio hardware. 
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Figure 5. An Example of router_config Message in LNS 
As noted above, the proposed safeguard features are flexible and can be switched 
on or off depending on different scenarios and practices.  For example, the proposed 
safeguard features could be enabled for the formal deployment of LoRa Gateways or 
disabled for small area lab testing. 
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